Australians at War Film Archive

Well, Long Tan, my recollections

are 1966, on the night of the 16th August around about two forty five in the morning we were recovering from a night of entertaining a couple of American pilots that used to support us and gone to bed and in the distance I was woken up by this pop, pop, pop, and I thought, “Goodness gracious me that sounds like we’re being mortared.” And sure enough in about thirty seconds I heard the explosions. And they weren’t in our company location,

they were about probably half a mile away back in the engineer area mainly where the casualties were. I remember, I ran across to our underground command post and had my boots on back to front and tore the skin off my ankles. But anyway we sat out the rest of the night and I indeed reported to our battalion headquarters that in addition to mortars, I thought we could hear a field gun firing, but that wasn’t recognised at the time.

In the morning I was aware that another company, an old classmate of mine Noel Ford took his company out at the orders of our Task Force battalion to look for what was suspected to be simply a small group of enemy that fired onto the Task Force base. They, I was aware, listening to the radio communications all day, that they had found a number of base plate positions

and signs of enemy wounded, blood trails and they stayed out there that night without any great protection on the edge of the Long Tan rubber plantation. And the following morning my commanding officer, Colonel Townsend, called me up early in the morning and he said, “I want you to take…”my company” which was Delta Company of the 6th Battalion out to take over from Noel Ford fully equipped so that we could in fact do a proper search for the enemy, which we

expected quite honestly to be long gone. The only information that was given to us was that a small group of enemy, probably thirty to forty had mortared the base and gone, but we were to go out and see if we could locate anything further. So I gave orders to my company, we kitted up, we test fired our guns and we took off fairly quickly much to the disappointment of most of them because there was a wonderful concert that day, Col Joye and Little Pattie [Australian entertainers], but anyway we set off

around about ten am and we had to go out through the long grass across a delta flat, across the Song Ri River and into the edge of the Long Tan rubber where we met Noel Ford, who at that stage of the game had sent most of his company back to go on leave and there was no threat to him and he was just sitting there with about twenty eight guys. We sat down and talked about it and Noel

took me around and showed me the various things that he’d found. We were escorted of course by some of my company headquarters support section and my signallers. We saw some empty mortar shells, some webbing, bloodstains and a number of tracks where the enemy had gone, some that way, some that way. I discussed what I had found with my platoon commanders. The platoon commanders are of course the guys that look after about

thirty soldiers. It’s their command and I had Geoff Kendall at 10 Platoon, at that stage Gordon Sharp with 11Platoon and David Sabben in 12 Platoon and in addition to that I had a very capable New Zealand gunner officer with me, Maurie Stanley and his small group, and I gave them my interpretation of the fact that the enemy had been there, had been hit by our artillery counter bombardment

on the night they fired and had gone. They might have split into small sections and gone right left and centre. I spoke on the radio to my battalion commander and suggested to him that I was going to east. It was simply a gut feeling. There were tracks going to the north and to the south but I said, “Well, the jungle is towards the east we’ll go east.” and basically it was a toss of a coin, go east young man. And I, in open rubber I gave orders for my company to spread

out about four hundred metres across. 11 Platoon with Bob, sorry with Gordon Sharp commanding on the right, Geoff Kendall on the left and David Sabben’s platoon behind me in reserve and we moved off to the east and we hadn’t gone far and firing broke out to my right and back over the radio came a report that Gordon Sharp’s platoon, 11 Platoon, had run into a small patrol. Indeed the patrol walked into

the platoon with their heads down and bums up basically talking. They didn’t know that we were there. One of those was killed, the enemy and that platoon sought permission to follow up the others who were running to the east and I gave approval thinking it was simply an enemy section and I held the rest of the company there. A short time later all hell broke loose. An enormous amount of firing and Gordon Sharp reported back

that he was under heavy fire and in fact very quickly became pinned down and his platoon sergeant, Bob Buick, later reported, not very long into the battle that Gordon had been killed and that Bob had taken over command. Bob was talking to the artillery adviser and Maurie Stanley was putting artillery fire down in support and I manoeuvred the company across further into the

rubber because we were fired on by mortars and over to our right we heard pop, pop, pop and then bang, bang, bang and they didn’t hit us, but they were pretty close so I said, “Okay, let’s all move over about three hundred metres.” which we did and waited for the outcome of what was going on. The situation got worse. Bob reported back that they were taking heavy casualties and running out of ammunition. I decided then I had to try and get 11 Platoon back so I

ordered Geoff Kendall who said he had no opposition out to his front to do a flanking attack around to the left and try and take up the pressure on, off 11 Platoon. So Geoff went on his way and I was left with company headquarters, the artillery party and the other platoon, David Sabben’s platoon. Geoff hadn’t gone far when he in fact ran into trouble and became heavily engaged with probably a company or more of Viet Cong.

He reported that he was taking casualties. I ordered him to return, which he did and came back into the company location. I then told David Sabben to take his platoon around to the right and see if that could be successful and indeed Maurie Stanley and myself and company headquarters were going to take off with 12 Platoon leaving my support section to look after the casualties and at

this stage of the game there were a few casualties coming back from 10 Platoon. We hadn’t gone more than about fifty metres and Maurie said to me, “I can’t control the artillery and look at the maps on the move, we have to stop.” and I agreed with him. And I told David to take his platoon and keep on going and Maurie and I basically returned back to where the company headquarters area was and proceeded to monitor the artillery fire. Maurie was heavily committed in

actually saying where the guns were to go, responding to what Bob Buick wanted and he was the main person at the time who required fire. I realised that we needed reinforcements. I called up Noel Ford who had gone from where we had met him at lunchtime back towards the base with his platoon and I asked Noel to come back. I spoke to him personally so he stopped and later turned to come back. I asked the

battalion for reinforcements by helicopter. Unfortunately they felt it was too dangerous to fly helicopters in to the rubber area, edge of the rubber where we were that morning and I was told in due course we would receive reinforcements by steel, armoured personnel carriers, which are pretty common around the place these days. And I also called for an ammunition re-supply by helicopter to drop the ammunition

into us and I also called for an air strike which was designed to put bombs, rockets and napalm on the enemy positions which were at that time attacking 11 Platoon and also by now 12 Platoon, which had become embroiled in the conflict. That situation just went on and on, more casualties were reported from 11 Platoon and then 12 and eventually we lost contact with 11 Platoon and I

must say my worst fears were that they had been overrun. A short time later however the radio came back on air because what had happened one of the enemies bullets had blown the aerial off and they found another spare aerial and put it on and restored communications. And at about that time the helicopters arrived and we had to throw smoke for them to identify where we were, the smoke going up through the trees

and eventually the ammunition was dropped right on top of us which was, you know a face saving situation for everybody because we only had somewhere, I understand from my CSM [company sergeant major], who was killed some time later unfortunately, an artillery accident some months later, that there was only about a thousand rounds left in the whole company, about eighty odd survivors and that’s not a lot of bullets particularly when you’re firing a five or six hundred a minute in a

machine gun. The coloured smoke which was thrown allowed Bob Buick’s remaining platoon guys or 11 Platoon to locate 12 Platoon and they eventually fought their way back to where we were. And then I put all the platoons out in a defensive position which is to cover various arcs so that we were best protected all round and

we just slugged it out for the rest of the time until about seven o’clock that night. When I say we slugged it out, my company kept firing at the assaulting waves of Viet Cong. It wasn’t a continual assault. They would assault with the artillery and we fired over three and a half thousand rounds that afternoon. Our own machine gun fire, our small arms fire, we obviously caused havoc and

we took a few casualties, not many, because we were a bit lucky. We were lying on the ground and we were in what’s known as a reverse slope. In other words it was a slope, they were on one side and we were on the other and unless they got up in the trees they couldn’t actually fire right down into us unless they got within twenty five metres away. Some of them did, but they didn’t last very long. And this went on and on. Around about six o’clock I

was told well into the battle that the armoured personnel carriers had left the base and at about ten to seven Noel Ford’s company finally arrived back, his company being a platoon and I put them out to protect the southern area. The battle seemed to slow up a bit. I suggest in hindsight the enemy knew the APCs were coming and had started to withdraw,

and at about seven o’clock the APCs, ten of them arrived, dark, raining and the battle was over. The enemy left and we survived. We lost seventeen killed and twenty two wounded. The APCs lost, the armoured personnel carriers they lost one killed, died of wounds and there was another wounded fellow. And then we later

withdrew back to get the casualties out and went back in the next morning to find the battlefield strewn with relics of a battle. We found our own, couple of our own guys still alive. We found our missing, killed in action and we found an awful lot of enemy bodies and weapons and that basically was the Battle of Long Tan.

I had called for an air strike and we have in Vietnam what they called a CAP which is a bunch of aeroplanes that were on alert, on priority call and the aeroplanes were always preceded

by a little fixed wing aeroplane called a FAC, forward air controller and he used to fly around in his aeroplane and talk to the people on the ground. He would then ask for coloured smoke to be thrown at the extremities left or right, front or back so that they could then direct his aeroplanes, fighters and fighter bombers to put their napalm, rocket or bombs where we wanted them and we had called for this support. When the air support arrived, I think

probably around about five o’clock, it was torrential, monsoonal rain, and you talk about rain, you couldn’t see from here to the door. Everything was wet and in addition to the wetness of the rain, shall I say, the artillery shells of which there were thousands all stirred up cordite smoke and haze and mist so basically on the ground it was almost impossible to see more than fifty metres and looking down from above I

can well imagine because I’ve done a fair bit of, above the ground work with parachuting, they would be lucky to see much at all and consequently when I talked to the forward air controller on the radio myself, they could not identify where we were. They could not see the coloured smoke that we were throwing and I then had to tell the battalion commander to get rid of the aeroplanes and give me back the artillery because to bring in the aeroplanes over

our position we had to stop the guns firing and the guns were more important to me at that time to give the close support and knock down the enemy assaulting waves than it was to get the bombs there. So the battalion headquarters and the Task Force fire control centre then organised the American planes to drop their ordnance as they call it, which is their bombs and rockets in areas behind where the enemy were attacking from, hopefully not going to cause a danger to us because

some damage to the enemy rear echelons, and I believe they really did, from what we saw the next couple of days. So the aeroplanes went away and we got back on with the battle firing the guns and I was able to get the artillery back in close support. People say, you know, how close did you bring it? I remember saying to my artillery commander, Maurie Stanley, you know, “Drop another fifty and back over.” he gave the order and back over the net

came, “We consider that is too dangerous.” and I recall saying, “If you don’t bloody well fire the guns you can write us off!” You know, you do what I want at this time, so they fired and we got that wave knocked out and I think we took one casualty from that but unless those guns were right in front of us then we wouldn’t have survived.

The guns were back at the Task Force base….

The artillery were back at the Task Force base. We had an artillery regiment…. The artillery that I was calling for and was being directed on the ground by Maurie Stanley, the forward controller, who actually saw where the rounds were landing and therefore could radio back to the guns which were four thousand

metres behind us back at the Task Force base. We had a New Zealand battery, we had two Australian batteries and we had an American 155 millimetre, which is about yay big shells, mobile on tanks. They were all firing as directed by Maurie Stanley in areas that either Bob or myself or Geoff Kendall or Dave Sabben required them. So they fired from behind us over our heads onto the enemy who were attacking us. And it was very

important for us to have that artillery fire, and indeed I think I can say apart from the enormous amount of fire power put down by my own company, the artillery is one of the reasons I’m sitting here now looking at you. The, unfortunately and of course the ammunition that was flown in by the helicopters, we had two helicopters come out, they were actually conveying Little Pattie and

Col Joye and their band around the Task Force area. They had flown them up from Nui Dat which was down on the coast about forty kilometres, which was a safe haven for the air force and our base people who provided all the stores and they were actually there at the Task Force base when my call for reinforcements and ammunition re-supply went. I understand there was some procrastination because our air force at that time hadn’t given approval for helicopters to fly into dangerous areas

but eventually they decided they would do it and Frank Riley, who unfortunately is not with us now, he was the leader, and he said he will take it and they brought it in and they dropped it right on top of us. Again they had to fly through heavy rain, locate where we were. Indeed they flew over us I understand in hindsight, talking with Bob Granden in latter years, and they turned around and came back and found us and they dropped that ammunition right into what I have said

my CSM’s lap, my CSM being my company sergeant major who was responsible for giving out the ammunition.

I think the air force did a wonderful job and indeed Frank Riley was decorated for his leadership of that flight

even though there were only two helicopters. They had to become involved in flying into a combat zone where they knew there was a large force of enemy firing. They weren’t aware when they left the base that the enemy could probably not see them overhead because of the canopy of the trees. They had great difficulty with the rain, torrential rain coming down and without the aid of things we have now such as GPS [global positioning satellite] where everybody

knows where everybody else is, not in 1966, but they did locate us from the grid references that I had given them and initially they had some problem in, because of the rain but they forgot about enemy fire. They could have been fired at. They could have been shot down but they weren’t and luckily we got our ammunition and they survived.

I recall the battle developed far beyond our expectations on that day. We were really set out to, I think find some enemy, a small group of enemy, a wild goose chase I think everybody thought about this and you know why should we miss the damn concert with everybody else at the Task Force sitting back there listening to the music

watching Col Joye and Little Pattie and we’re out here in the hot and humidity and then it started to rain. And about the same time that it started to rain that’s when we ran into trouble on the right hand side with 11 Platoon. And when the platoons finally came back to the company position the enemy obviously realised that we were only in one group and I think luckily for our survival they weren’t quite sure where we were because they had guys in front of them,

they had guys on the right and they had guys on the left. So when we all came back in the one position they obviously then knew that we were in one position and then they started to take us on in a big way. And of course they just used the human wave assault and they would line up and then roll into us. We would mow them down and I have to say that. Our machine guns and fire from our rifles just mowed them down in their front echelons,

in their front lines and they, their bodies just fell on top of each other and almost mounds of bodies. They would then get up and form up again and come on again over the top of the bodies and keep on pushing on. Our artillery of course was striking at them as often and as quickly as we could fire those guns and I have to say that the New Zealand artillery fire controller did a wonderful job putting the artillery fire where

Bob or I or others said, “We want the guns there now!” or there and there depending on where the enemy came from, whether they came from over there or then they came from over there. The, you know the rain and the smoke from the artillery and the explosions and I have a recollection of an enormous amount of noise, a continuous,

I’ve lost the word sorry… a continuous volume of machine gun and rifle fire and coming at us like millions of fireflies. Red ones, green ones and white ones as these tracers just came towards us over our heads in the most cases, although I remember looking in front of me and Jack Thompson my mortar fire controller was lying behind a rubber tree,

it was great cover because the rubber trees are that long and his head was that wide so it really wasn’t of much use but it was psychological protection. And we hadn’t had time or the opportunity to dig trenches and it wouldn’t be much use anyway because it was just red mud, red mud, and I remember looking at Jack and looking over him towards the enemy and seeing the tree just above his head being peppered by tracer rounds just going straight through it. You know it’s all very well to look back on it

now and think about it but at the time there was an awful lot of noise, rain, smoke, machine guns, you name it. But I don’t think anybody really was frightened. Somebody said to me once was I frightened, and I said, “No, I was too busy to become frightened.” All I was doing in fact was doing what I had been trained to do. I’d seen the odd angry shot fired in Malaya in the Malayan Confrontation [he means the Malayan Emergency]

and that particular day I started off with a hundred and eight guys and I simply directed which platoon to go where or which artillery area was to be fired, helicopters brought in and I was so busy giving orders or listening to information that was brought into me by my radio operators or talking to my battalion commander and urging the reinforcements to be brought out or asking for an air strike that I never had time to become frightened.

And I recall towards the end of the battle when Noel Ford came in, Noel and I were classmates at Portsea and Noel went back to Australia and unfortunately his car was found at Bondi Beach, he’d gone swimming and failed to return to his car. Another Harold Holt [prime minister] tragedy I think. And Noel and I discussed the situation and I was able to walk around and tell Noel exactly where to put his soldiers and that was about ten to seven and not long

after that the APCs, these aluminium boxes as they are, with tank tracks on them which carried roughly a section or about ten soldiers with a machine gun on top, they arrived firing their fifty calibre machine guns and although there weren’t many of them, and I’m quite sure had the enemy known there was only ten they were very capable of taking on ten armoured personnel carriers and they decided they’d had enough and they left

and that was the end of the battle.

The enemy escalated from initially; probably what we call a section, about ten.

I think in fact Bob Buick told me from 11 Platoon there were about eight VC [Viet Cong]. They reported, in fact 11 Platoon reported back to me that the enemy were dressed in khaki and the weapon that they captured from the dead Viet Cong soldier was what we call this armoured, sorry the AK47 assault rifle which is the most famous assault rifle used in almost every theatre

of war around the world but it was developed in Russia, Krasnikov I think it is. It didn’t twig to me at that stage of the game that the local Vietnamese, the D45, local battalion who were normally dressed in, you know greens or t-shirts or black pyjamas, it didn’t dwell on me this, that these weren’t local guerrillas, these in fact were Main Force Vietnamese, properly

trained, regular army troops that had come down from up north, up in the province and nor did I know that they had a North Vietnamese battalion with them. We had gone out looking for probably thirty or forty local Viet Cong and so when 11 Platoon became bogged down, if I could use that expression and surrounded, virtually surrounded, they weren’t completely surrounded at any stage of the game and attacked it.

The reports that came back to me from Gordon Sharp initially before he was killed and then Bob Buick indicated that the enemy built up a with a company and then probably two companies, probably three companies and I realised that you know we were in big trouble and that’s when I started to ask for reinforcements, asked for all the artillery. I recall at one stage of the game calling up my battalion commander, we only had normally six guns firing in support

and when things started to build up I remember calling on the radio I said you know, “Give me the whole bloody regiment now!” and I think my battalion commander said to me, “Well that’s fine, but you let the artillery men control the guns and we’ll give you the support.” which they did. I had no idea until the following morning when we started to interrogate prisoners and look at some of the evidence

that we took off the captured and the dead, that indeed we had run into a regiment of main force Viet Cong, a regiment being somewhere in the order of two and a half thousand enemy soldiers. Now I don’t suspect that we were faced with two and a half thousand but from what I saw and what I believe and the amount of fire I would suggest that at any one time we probably had a full battalion of eight hundred,

maybe in relays of other battalions right on our front door and we were outnumbered at most times I would probably think eight to ten to one. Taking out my casualties, which were considerable we probably only had you know sixty to seventy guys actually returning fire but we were supported by the artillery and those sixty or seventy guys did their job that day and they did it extremely well.

Mostly if a young National Serviceman I can say that those guys, that day, did everything above and beyond the call of anything that I would have ever expected of them. And I can only say that I’m very proud to command those guys. I’m very sad that some of them were lost. I’m very sad that their families and loved ones were affected but we were soldiers. We were there

to do our job to support the country and we did our best to do it. With the armoured personnel carriers arriving I had requested reinforcements as I said by helicopter but the Task Force considered that was too dangerous. In hindsight I doubt that decision. They should have flown in a couple of companies with American

helicopters and landed them, you know, much earlier. But of course I didn’t know that there were no other companies come out because the Task Force was caught really with its pants down and there was no ready reaction force so when Alpha Company finally got back from their patrol and re-kitted they were then sent out in the armoured personnel carriers, ten of them which eventually arrived with us. They fought through a couple of areas where Viet Cong were coming around the back shall I say to attack us

and they ran into them and they fought their way through there with minimal casualties but certainly they created a fear amongst the Viet Cong who, those elements withdrew and I recall looking across to my right which was to the south at about seven o’clock and all of a sudden amongst the noise of the machine guns and artillery there appeared the noise of diesel engines and here were these armoured personnel carriers

coming through the gloom, guns firing and some of my forward soldiers got up because the enemy, as soon as these tanks arrived the enemy just turned and left. Now there was not another shot fired and I think a lot of my soldiers thought that they were never going to arrive and that we would never get out of it and a lot of them stood up and went over and gave the carriers a gentle pat on the side and certainly shook the hands of the

armoured corps guys and probably some of the A Company guys that came out in the carriers. We were certainly very pleased to see them to say the least yes. The enemy that we ran into you know took us by surprise. We didn’t expect to find, other than local force guerrillas and it was quite obvious once the battle developed with that forward platoon, 11 Platoon that we were up

against more than just local Viet Cong because Bob Buick was telling me that these guys are dressed in uniforms, khaki uniforms with pith helmets and camouflage all over them and carrying, you know the best weapons. In fact I think they had what is recognised to be the best assault rifle and the best machine guns in the world at that time and they obviously, from what we found the next morning carried a lot more ammunition that we did. We at that time

were only carrying about sixty rounds per rifle. We were carrying more for machine guns of course and that was our standard at that time because we didn’t expect to run into a Main Force enemy and have to defend ourselves. This was the first time in the Nui Dat Task Force that we’d come across anything like this. Of course, after the event, we then find out that the Task Force had had information by radio

signal intercept that the Viet Cong 5th Division Headquarters had been tracked a couple of days earlier with a radio intercept right behind Nui Dat. But that information for some reason was never disseminated down to me personally or to my company and I don’t think my battalion commander knew, otherwise there’s no way in the world that they would have sent a company out to look for what could have been the best part of a Viet Cong/North Vietnamese reinforced

division. And as it turned out after the event from the information we got from prisoners, from documents captured at the battle and from documents captured by the Americans who found a large withdrawal base camp and hospital complex out to the east that indeed we ran into a, the 275 Vietnamese Regular Army Main Force

Regiment along with a battalion of top line, well trained, beautifully equipped, North Vietnamese professional soldiers complete with all their artillery, mortars, medical and stores support. I think while we faced small arms on the ground we really didn’t have a lot of trouble from their mortars and it’s something that nobody has ever been able to understand where did all the mortars

and their guns go because I did recall hearing a gun amongst the mortars the night they fired and eventually it was found out by the intelligence people back in Task Force, but not before we went out that indeed there was a fuel gun that had fired, a captured French gun or Japanese gun I forget which but that indicated that these were regulars. They weren’t just the local Viet Cong. And

now we know of course that they had come down from the north east of the province and there is no doubt in my mind, or in the official historian’s mind that they were about to take on the Australian Task Force base. And I’m pretty sure that one can say that we had caused problems to the local Viet Cong by relocating a couple of villages and you know basically our presence there

was enough for the North Vietnamese regime to want to inflict a political and military victory over the Australians. And at that time the Task Force base was very poorly defended, most of the troops were out on patrol. There were very few minefields. There was very little wire and I’m sure that that regiment, had it been able to walk in there unannounced would have caused terrible devastation amongst the Australian forces in the

base. We, I guess, were lucky, for the benefit of the boast that we happened to stumble on these people, these forces that they had there. We have often been accused of walking into an ambush heads down and bums up. That was not so. We never had our heads down and bums up. We were always looking where we were going and we certainly didn’t anticipate a regiment but

they were there, they were in what we call a resting position or a LUP, lying up position, waiting, we believe to attack the base. There is very little doubt about that in the year 2000. After the battle when the carriers came in some time during that night or about eleven o’clock we started to move back to the area where the helicopters could take out

the bodies and the wounded and we stayed there all night, we weren’t attacked by the enemy. In fact we felt that the enemy had gone because there was no evidence that the enemy was still around the battlefield. I was terribly worried because I still had fifteen of 11 Platoon missing and I didn’t know whether they were alive, dead or had been captured and we’d heard all these terrible stories from the Americans up in the northern provinces

what atrocities were committed to American soldiers that had been captured on a battlefield, and I must say that I was troubled all night. Indeed I didn’t want to leave the battlefield. I argued with my commander that we should have stayed on the battlefield all night but I didn’t win the argument and we were forced to withdraw back to a safer area to get the casualties out. I was also very keen to get back there first thing the next morning because they were my soldiers that

were missing and my company, but the matter was taken out of my hands and it escalated into, not a company’s return, it became a battalion, and then really a Task Force order where we had more VIPs [very important persons] around us than there were soldiers before we were allowed to go back in there. But when we did get back in there I went in with Adrian Roberts [commander of the APCs] and his section of tracks first. I insisted on doing that although

somebody suggested we should have been sent back to base and sent on leave. I refused to do that. As I say, they were my soldiers and I wanted to see my own soldiers whether they be wounded or unfortunately killed in action. We went back in to where 11 Platoon had been attacked by the Viet Cong and the scene was as though a fully fledged tornado or cyclone had hit the area. There wasn’t

hardly a leaf left on the trees. The artillery had blown all the leaves off the trees. The ground was covered in that much mulch, shall I say. There were enemy bodies everywhere. There were enemy weapons everywhere. Absolute devastation, areas where the artillery had blown holes in the ground. I personally let Bob Buick and the 11 Platoon guys go in amongst their own and recover them. We found two

of our guys still alive, one chap who lives near me now Jimmy Richmond and another chap Barry Meller, they were still alive and survived the night. The rest unfortunately were dead and we recovered their bodies and then we set about for the rest of that day burying the enemy dead and recovering the weapons that they’d left behind and trying to, from the best of my knowledge there were three only Vietnamese

prisoners that were interrogated by the intelligence people. And I sort of smile to myself now when all sorts of people say you know, “What were they doing there?” you know, they were ambushing us. In fact the first prisoner that we interrogated said, “We were on the way to attack the Task Force base.” and I guess that’s got to be good enough for me. So we actually, as part of the battalion, it then became a battalion

Operation Smithfield, the name that was coined I guess to represent my situation as a company commander, Operation Smithfield. Most of our operations were called after Australian towns or cities and Smithfield was a very nice choice for me and my company and for the next three to four days we searched the general area and proceeded well out to the east but we didn’t fire a shot and we saw no enemy.

We found a lot of blood trails. We found a lot of bodies and quickly dug graves where they had buried their wounded as they fell as they went back. And indeed you know as the years go by more and more evidence comes to us and in research that I undertook last year at the [Australian] War Memorial we found out that in the next tour of 6RAR they found a large base out to the north

east with a lot of records that were showing what happened at Long Tan. And we believe now that the enemy that were killed at Long Tan or died of wounds amounted to eight hundred dead, and that’s the information and when you look back at the amount of artillery and the fact that we found two hundred and fifty bodies on the battlefield one can only imagine how many they dragged away which is their normal training to take off

the battlefield as many of their dead and wounded as they can. That’s part of it. They wore little cane or webbing straps around their ankles so their comrades could pick them up and drag them away. So the fact that they left two hundred and fifty behind must indicate just how many they lost and they lost an awful lot even though the Vietnamese Government never recognised that. They always claimed in fact that they destroyed an Australian battalion. I think it was ten tanks and two aircraft but indeed it was the other way around.

If the Battle at Long Tan had been lost I’m sure that you know Australia would have suffered a

disastrous political and military defeat. I think probably there being another regiment out to the northwest, which again was learnt after the Battle of Long Tan, not only was the regiment where we were there was also another regiment out to the north west along, we believe with all their artillery and mortars which were designed to cut off any reinforcements from the north, from Americans up at Bien Hoa and Saigon area. I believe with hindsight

that the Vietnamese regiments, two of basically a division would have just rolled over the Task Force and given the few people, combat troops in the base, and I personally believe that they would have wiped that Task Force base out. Now a lot of people won’t agree with me but our bases were very lightly defended. At that time of Long Tan there were very few combat troops in the base

and it would have been a disaster but luckily it didn’t happen.

Yeah we were in a… We were in a young rubber tree plantation. Rubber trees of course grow to you know that big in diameter and they cut little grooves around them and out runs the white latex which of course is the basis of most rubber compounds and the local Vietnamese

they were farmers or rubber tappers would have collected this latex when the trees became mature. And these trees that we were in were only about six inches across. And I said to you earlier that I remember bullets going through the tree right in front of me where Jack Thompson was lying and apart from the bits of wood that came flying out the back of the tree, the trees were weeping the latex and the next morning when we went back in everywhere the artillery had damaged the trees

and the branches had been blown off, the trunks had been blown apart, some completely decimated you know there was white latex oozing out of all these rubber trees. Yeah, one of my most vivid memories of the effect of the enemy bullets on the trees was looking in front of me and seeing one of my sergeants, the mortar controller, Sergeant Jack Thompson from Cairns now, he’s retired there,

the bullets just going through the trees just over his head. The rubber trees were only about six to eight inches around and therefore they were very immature. They hadn’t become suitable for tapping. In Malaya the big mature trees were probably this big and the rubber tappers would come along and cut these little grooves, put a cup underneath the grooves and the latex, this white latex milk which is the basis of all rubber products, natural rubber products in those days and today

is gathered. But when the bullets went through the bits of wood were flying off the back of the trees and out would drip this white latex and the following morning when we went back through the battlefield I recall everywhere the artillery had decimated the trees and blown the branches and trunks apart there was white rubber weeping out all over the remaining trees.

My opinion of the Vietnam War is that we as a country that has to take our part as we have done in all conflicts throughout our history, we’ve always been there to support other nations. We were asked to support the Americans and support the South Vietnamese being overrun by the North Vietnamese. I was a professional soldier, a regular

soldier. Basically I did as I was told. I think that our involvement there was right. I know it became a very unpopular war with the Moratoriums and the uprisings, particularly in the United States which flowed back into Australia. The toll there wasn’t so much on the government; the toll of the Moratoriums was on the soldiers. The soldiers felt

that they had been on a useless war and a useless escapade whereas indeed we were there doing what we had to do for the free world. And I think it’s unfortunate that Vietnam until recent years has always been regarded as a, one of our downside activities in excursions overseas in war. I think as far as the Defence Force is concerned I think we can be very

proud that we fought in Vietnam. I think the Australian soldier, particularly at battles like Long Tan and there were other big ones such Coral and Balmoral, and lots of other skirmishes of note, I think we showed that we still can perpetuate the traditional legend of Anzac, the gallantry, the individual heroism of soldiers, the comradeship, how people can support each other in battle when the chips are down

and still survive and still bring credit on our nation and show that Australia is indeed able to stand up and be counted in this world, the same as it has been in [East] Timor in this day and age.

I guess

I have not had a great personal problem with the Vietnam War because I was a professional soldier but as the years have gone by, particularly as I’ve perhaps lost a bit of confidence in life, I was badly injured in a parachute accident in 1975 which took a lot of my physical ability and my confidence and self esteem away,

although I still don’t stand still, but I’m severely restricted in what I can do. I think since then I’ve become a little bit sad about some of the things that happened to us over there, particularly the loss of the soldiers and some wonderful young men lost their lives. It’s a very sad situation. My own personal life, I don’t believe suffered greatly although I’ve

had trouble I guess, as most Vietnam veterans have, in coming to terms with the lack of support that was given to us initially by our fellow Australians and our government. And it’s only in recent years I think that the government has come to terms that we did do our best and that we should receive for those that suffered the benefits that should go to soldiers who serve and give, prepared to give their lives in war

and here we are now in the year 2001 and in fact I now feel that the government is recognising the Vietnam War and the people of Australia, the children of Australia are starting to come to terms with what happened back in the years 1965 to 1973. And certainly Long Tan, to me, I’m very proud now that I guess I was there and that I was the company commander and it was

basically a company battle supported by all these other people. And without the other support of course we would not have survived but let me not underestimate the courageous way in which my soldiers fought that day, and most of us therefore survived. And I’m very proud of being the company commander at the time. I’m just sorry that there are still some outstanding matters that our government refuses to

come to terms with, in fact it amazes me in this year when we’ve been struggling ever since the secrecy period, we were awarded Vietnamese decorations, the government has never been able to come to terms, to see their way clear to give them to the veterans of Long Tan. I can’t, I just can’t come to terms with this and I guess I’ve got a chip on my shoulder about that. We were poorly

regarded in terms of the honours and awards that were bestowed upon the company compared with, for example the truckloads of awards that have been given very quickly for Timor. And by all means they certainly earned them but I think a lot of the soldiers that served there still say that their dolls that they were given by the Vietnamese Government when the Australians refused their gallantry awards is still something that our government needs to come to terms with.